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Abstract We assess the subsidy for the installation of biomass boilers and wood
gasification boilers under the Greener Homes Scheme in Ireland. We find that the
(implicit) subsidy per tonne of carbon dioxide avoided varies hugely across
households. The current policy costs 17 % too much for the emissions avoided, or
avoids 17 % too little for the money spent. The subsidy reduces net social gain
(including environmental benefits but excluding producer surplus) by 42 %.
Keywords Climate policy  Ireland  Ex-post evaluation
JEL Classification Q48  Q54
1 Introduction
There are many ex-ante estimates of the costs of greenhouse gas emission reduction
(see, for example, Clarke et al. 2009). Most of these studies assume cost-effective
implementation of climate policy, although there are also papers that study the
effect of one particular deviation from the first best (see, for example, Babiker et al.
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2003). This paper is different. It is ex-post in that it estimates the costs of a policy
that has been implemented. The paper focuses on the excess costs of the policy,
which was designed in such a clumsy way that no academic economist would ever
think of an ex-ante analysis of this kind of intervention. The paper is about a minor
subsidy (for biomass heating) in a small country (Ireland), but its implications are
wider than that. There is no reason to assume that climate policy would be designed
as recommended in an economics textbook. As a result, emission abatement may be
considerably more expensive than typically assumed. This paper contributes to the
quantification of the excess cost.
The European Union’s climate-and-energy package states that renewable energy
should account for 20 % of the EU’s final energy consumption by 2020. For Ireland,
16 % of the final energy consumption should come from renewables by 2020
(European Commission 2011). The production of renewable energy must come
from 3 areas: electricity, heating, and transport. The Greener Homes Scheme (GHS)
was introduced in 2006 (and closed in 2011) with the aim of increasing the use of
renewable energy and sustainable energy technologies in Irish homes. It thus helps
Ireland meet its targets in the Renewable Energy Sources for Heating and Cooling
(RES-H) category. The scheme provides a grant to domestic property owners to
contribute to the initial capital cost of installing a renewable heating technology.
Initially, the scheme was available for residents of both existing and new dwellings;
however, in July 2008 the scheme was restricted to existing homes. Between 2006
and 2010, 31,560 households received grants under the scheme. As much as 59 % of
the households availing of the scheme installed solar thermal, 20 % installed
biomass stoves and boilers, 20 % installed heat pumps and less than 1 % installed
wood gasification boilers. The total amount offered in grants between 2006 and
2010 was approximately €68.4 million. Was this money spent wisely? Could the
same money have avoided more emissions? Could the same emissions be avoided
for less money? In this paper, we answer those questions for biomass boilers.
We limit ourselves to biomass boilers because these replace previous heating
systems. Heat pumps provide supplemental heat, and therefore reduce only a fraction
of the carbon dioxide emissions from heating. That fraction is unknown to us. Solar
thermal provides supplemental heat, replacing an, to us, unknown share of heat supply.
These restrictions bias our conclusions. Ireland has a maritime climate with limited
variation in temperature between summer and winter. Heat pumps are therefore not
very effective. Ireland is also not optimal for solar thermal. In our analysis, we ignore
the fact that 79 % of the subsidy was spent on less suited technologies.
The GHS is only one of the three schemes aimed at reducing emissions by
changing and reducing energy use in the residential sector in Ireland. The Warmer
Homes Scheme (WHS) aims to improve the energy efficiency and comfort
conditions of the homes of those on low incomes. Measures include the installation
of lagging jackets, attic insulation, cavity wall insulation, draught proofing and
energy-efficient lighting. Between 2000 and 2008, €10.9 m had been allocated to
the scheme which covered interventions in about 17,700 households (Department of
Social and Family Affairs 2009). The Home Energy Saving Scheme (HES) was
launched in March 2009 and is available to the owners of all dwellings built before
2006. Grants are provided for the investment in energy-efficient improvements such
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as roof insulation, wall insulation, installation of high-efficiency boilers or improved
heating controls. The energy rating of the building before and after the
improvements is compared. Over 111,000 homes had availed of the scheme by
the end of 2010 at a cost of over €47 million (SEAI 2011). Unfortunately, we have
access to the administrative data for the GHS only. We therefore do not analyse the
WHS or the HES, even though households are entitled to subsidies under both GHS
and either WHS or HES.
Besides subsidies for renewable energy technologies, Ireland levies a carbon tax
on oil and gas for home heating. Peat and coal are exempt. The oddly designed
carbon tax creates its own distortions. It also interacts with the GHS, incentivising
those who use the cleaner fossil fuels to switch to biomass energy. We ignore this
aspect, noting that we therefore understate the inefficiencies in the GHS.
To our knowledge, we are the first to carry out an assessment of a government
run renewable energy scheme for the residential sector in Ireland. There are a
number of studies of residential energy use in Ireland, for example, Leahy and
Lyons (2010), O’Doherty et al. (2008) and O’Leary et al. (2008). Scott (1997)
studied the uptake of energy-saving measures. Clinch and Healy (2001) conduct an
ex-ante cost–benefit analysis of the retro-fitting of homes. The study by the
Department of Social and Family Affairs (2009) is closest to ours. It carried out an
ex-post assessment of the energy, environmental, thermal comfort and health
benefits of the WHS. The study was based on a sample of 600 households, 257 of
which availed of subsidies under the WHS and 343 which did not (but who did
apply). The results show that control group improved the energy efficiency of their
houses to roughly the same degree as those that did receive a subsidy, so that there
was no significant difference between the control and the policy group with regard
to energy use, fuel poverty, comfort and health risks.
The paper continues as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3
presents the data and methods used. The results are presented in Sect. 4. Section 5
provides a discussion and conclusion.
2 Literature review
There have been ex-post studies of the costs of residential emission reduction for
other countries. Jenkins (2010) focused on a scheme that was available to fuel-poor
households in the UK. The measures considered were loft insulation, improved
lighting, improved glazing, draught proofing, external insulation, and improved
boiler and refrigeration. On comparing the results of 3 previous UK studies, Jenkins
(2010) finds that the cost of retrofitting a house, assuming that a carbon saving of at
least 50 % was achieved, varies from between £7,000 and £31,900. The annual cost
of saving a tonne of carbon as a result of the retrofit varies between £2,252 and
£10,250. Mills and Schleich (2009) studied the adoption of solar thermal
technologies in the German residential sector. Results show that households can
make moderate savings on energy expenditure from combined solar water and space
heating systems. However, there is no evidence of savings for those households that
install solar technologies for either space or water heating. There is also little
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evidence of differential adoption across socio-economic groups. The authors note
low adoption of solar technologies in the German housing market and attribute this
to the fixed housing stock and the relatively low savings potential. Amstalden et al.
(2007) analysed the profitability, from the homeowner’s point of view, of investing
in energy-efficient retrofit measures in the Swiss residential market. The authors find
that the profitability of the investment is heavily influenced by expected future
energy prices. If oil prices are at 2005 levels or higher, the investment in energy-
efficient retrofit measures would be profitable, even without government supports.
Concerning market intervention, a combination of policy options such as subsidies,
income tax deductions and a carbon tax would make the investment profitable even
when oil prices are relatively low. The authors argue that subsidies alone would not
make the investment profitable unless oil prices rise substantially. Wasi and Carson
(2011) examine recent rebate programmes aimed at increasing the share of solar/
heat pump systems for the purpose of residential water heating in New South Wales.
Using a specifically designed survey, the authors collect information from
homeowners who have recently purchased the water heater. They find that the
rebate programme increased the share of solar/heat pump systems by 43 % for
households who do not have access to natural gas. For those with natural gas access,
the programme increased the share of solar/heat pump systems by 19 %. It appears
that the rebate programmes were important only for those households that
deliberately set out to replace their water heater. The rebate programme was much
less effective when water heaters were replaced on an emergency basis. Data were
also collected on a group of respondents who were likely to replace their water
system in the near future. These data were analysed using several flexible choice
models. Results show that there is considerable heterogeneity in preferences
towards different types of water heaters as well as in the household discount rates.
Oritz and Markandya (2009) investigated the cost-effectiveness of different policy
options to promote the use of energy-efficient appliances in Europe. The authors
analysed energy taxes, subsidies, tax credits and bans. The improvement of
refrigerators, washing machines and boilers and the installation of energy-efficient
light bulbs in 4 European countries were considered. In each case the reduction in
CO2, the administrative costs and the welfare costs and gains were compared. The
best policy response was found to depend on the country and the appliance in
question. In most cases, subsidies were found to be more expensive than energy
taxes. Although subsidies tend to produce larger CO2 reductions, they tend also to
be associated with higher welfare costs. Metcalf (2009) analysed the US tax code in
relation to low carbon technologies. He argues that subsidies are inefficient because
they lower the cost of energy. The consumer is thus encouraged to respond in a
manner that contradicts the goal of emission reduction. Metcalf (2009) also makes
the point that it is difficult to achieve technology neutrality with subsidies. This
argument is most relevant for the GHS where different subsidies are awarded for
different technologies and all households are awarded a different price per tonne of
carbon avoided. According to Metcalf (2009), the promotion of carbon-free
technologies should be done by increasing the price of carbon and not by
subsidising clean-energy technologies.
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3 Data and methods
We use the anonymised micro-data for the GHS provided by the Sustainable Energy
Authority of Ireland (SEAI). The data set contains household information about the
amount of the grant provided, the type of product installed, the gross cost of the
installation, the size of the dwelling (in square feet or metres), the number of
bedrooms, the type of accommodation, the county in which the applicant lives, the
date on which the grant is provided and the fuel which is displaced. The data refers
to all of the grants that were allocated under the scheme between April 2006 and
October 2010. In total, 30,155 households received grants over this period. The
demand profile for different technologies over the course of the scheme is displayed
in Table 7. Table 8 shows the grants that were available at different time periods.
The average installation cost reported by applicants and the expected total cost of
the installation, as estimated by SEAI (2010), is also displayed.
First, we compute the average subsidy per tonne of carbon dioxide avoided for
each household. Second, assuming unchanged demand, we assess which households
would gain or lose if the subsidy amount was based on the amount of CO2 avoided
rather than the device. Third, using the price elasticities estimated above, we
simulate the changes in demand due to the hypothetical subsidy. Fourth, we
calculate the resulting changes in net social gain (excluding producer surplus).
We restrict the sample to those households that availed of grants for biomass
boilers and wood gasification boilers. To assess the cost of emission reduction, we
impute energy usage, total emissions and the emissions of the displaced fuel for
each household in the restricted sample. For this part of the analysis, we
incorporate the anonymised 2004/05 Household Budget Survey (HBS) (CSO
2007a) which was carried out on a representative random sample of private
households in Ireland. Administered by the Central Statistics Office of Ireland, the
main aim of the HBS was to determine household expenditure in order to update
the weightings used for the consumer price index. Detailed information is also
provided on income and household facilities. In 2004/05, 6,884 private households
participated in the survey. Households record expenditure on different fuel types
over specified periods, as well as the volume used.1 The price of fuel follows. We
then impute energy use for households that availed of the GHS by matching
households in the HBS to households in the GHS based on variables that are
common to both data sets: the type of dwelling, year built, the number of
bedrooms and primary heating fuel. Each household in our sample is thus a
representative of a group of similar households in the HBS. We estimate the
emissions of each fuel type for each household by multiplying the quantity by its
emission factor (Scott and Eakins 2004).
1 The HBS includes information on energy expenditure in new buildings up to 2004/05. In order to
estimate energy use and emissions of dwellings built after this date, we apply energy usage growth factors
which are displayed in Table 9. These growth factors are taken from Dineen and O´’Gallacho´ir (2011),
where the energy consumption of the average newly built dwelling between 1997 and 2020 is estimated.
The annual growth and/or decline in the demand for space heating, water heating, lighting and appliances
and cooking are separately estimated.
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Descriptive statistics on the imputed household energy usage and emissions for
the restricted sample are provided in Table 1. The average Irish household used
25,304 kWh of energy annually and emitted 8.1 tCO2; average electricity use per
annum is 5,591 kWh (O’Leary et al. 2008).2 Table 1 shows that the households that
availed of grants under the GHS used more energy, more electricity and emitted
more CO2 than the average Irish household. Leahy and Lyons (2010) found that
electricity usage in Irish homes increases with household income. This is probably
because wealthier households have more electrical appliances and may use them
more often. Households availing of the GHS use 12 % more electricity than the
average household. The average number of bedrooms for households availing of the
GHS is 4.2, while the 2004/05 HBS shows that the average household contains 3.4
bedrooms. Also, 95 % of GHS recipients live in detached houses, whereas the 2006
census shows that only 48 % of dwellings in Ireland are detached houses (CSO
2007b). All this indicates that GHS households are relatively rich. While it is
encouraging that those households that emit relatively high quantities of CO2 are
actively reducing their emissions, it also appears that the grants are being provided
to relatively wealthy individuals, who may have invested in renewable technologies
in the absence of government supports.
Baumol (1972) showed that, in a cost-effective emission reduction policy,
emissions are priced equally at the margin. In GHS, that is not necessarily the case.
Subsidies are granted for the purchase of heaters and boilers, rather than for their
use. Subsidies are independent of the fuel replaced, the size of house and its energy
efficiency. While the subsidy per boiler is the same for each household, the subsidy
per tonne of carbon dioxide avoided varies drastically.
Therefore, in the second part of the analysis, we analyse the imposition of subsidies
that are proportional to the emissions saved over the lifetime of the renewable
technology. We assume that the life of biomass boilers and wood gasification boilers is
20 years and we assume that household emissions are reduced by the same amount
each year over the 20-year period. We use a discount rate of 4 % because this is the rate
recommended for cost-effectiveness analysis of public sector projects (Department of
Finance 2011). Using OLS regressions, we estimate the elasticity of demand with
Table 1 Household energy use, electricity use and emissions in the GHS
Household
energy use
(kWh)
Household
electricity
use (kWh)
Household
emissions
(tCO2)
Emissions of
replaced fuel
(tCO2)
GHS
subsidy (€)
Total 102,905,990 21,499,594 62,938 17,383 13,515,600
Average 29,915 6,250 18 5 3,929
Standard deviation 4,388 1,372 4 2 586
Minimum 13,372 0 4 0 2,000
Maximum 47,796 9,647 29 17 4,200
2 In comparison, the 2004/05 HBS showed that average annual energy usage was 26,139 kWh, while
annual electricity use was 4,335 kWh (CSO 2007a).
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regard to the net cost of installations3 (i.e. the gross installation cost minus the subsidy
received)4 (see Table 2). We predict how households would adjust their demand in
response to changes in the level of subsidy. We also estimate the number of
households that would have availed of the renewable technologies even if no subsidy
had been provided. We also consider more elastic and more inelastic price elasticities
and present the resulting changes in the level of demand. In addition, we present the
resulting changes in the cost and emission avoidance level.
We consider three arbitrary subsidies: €20/tCO2 (FitzGerald et al. 2008), €15/tCO2
(the carbon tax that was introduced in December 2009) and €30/tCO2 (the carbon tax
proposed for 2014). We also consider ‘‘optimum’’ subsidies. In order to assess
environmental efficiency, we derive the maximum amount of emissions that could
have been avoided given that the budget for the scheme is €13.5 million, assuming that
each household receives the same subsidy per tCO2 avoided. Similarly, we examine
economic efficiency by deriving the degree to which the cost of the scheme could have
been reduced while keeping emission reduction at the current level.
Finally, we estimate the consumer surplus that is derived under different subsidy
scenarios.
4 Results
We present the results in four steps. First, we compute for each household the
average subsidy per tonne of carbon dioxide avoided. Second, we assess which
Table 2 Regression results:
dependent variable Ln (quantity
sold)
a Different from zero at the 1 %
significance level
Biomass boilers Wood gasification
boilers
Coef. SE Coef. SE
Ln (net cost) -0.867 0.019a -1.863 0.111a
Year -0.045 0.014a 0.062 0.066
# Bedrooms -0.007 0.011 -0.053 0.038
Type of house dummies Included Included
County dummies Included Included
Adj R2 0.877 0.457
N 3,336 104
3 Because the net cost is unique to each household, we group the net cost variable into bands of €500 and
we log the median price in each band. We also log the corresponding demand in each category. Using
OLS regressions, we then find the elasticity of demand for biomass and wood gasification boilers.
4 Occasionally, other refurbishments were carried out in addition to the installation of the renewable
technology. It appears that some households may have recorded the gross cost of all work done in the
dwelling as opposed to the cost of installing the GHS technology only. In order to minimise the possibility
of including incorrect estimates of the net cost, we omit the top 2.5 % and bottom 2.5 % of observations
based on the net cost variable. All of the households for which no gross cost is reported are also omitted.
The resulting sample contains 3,340 observations with the net cost ranging between €1,100 and €19,800.
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households would gain or lose if the subsidy was awarded for the amount of CO2
avoided rather than for purchasing a device. We do this assuming unchanged
demand. However, in the third step, using the price elasticities estimated above, we
simulate the changes in demand due to the hypothetical subsidy. Fourth, we
calculate the resulting changes in net social gain (excluding producer surplus).
4.1 The costs of emission reduction under the GHS
Figure 1 shows that the cost per tCO2 avoided varies hugely across the 3,336
5
households that installed biomass boilers. A total of 670 households receive a
subsidy of €615/tCO2 avoided and 68 % of households get subsidies even higher
than this. The costs of carbon dioxide mitigation for households that installed wood
gasification boilers are displayed in Fig. 2; 104 households in the restricted sample
availed of these subsidies.6 As much as 15 % of households that installed wood
gasification boilers get a subsidy of €374/tCO2 avoided and 47 % get subsidies even
higher than this. The average cost of carbon dioxide mitigation is almost 38 %
higher for biomass than it is for wood gasification boilers.
Table 3 shows the annuitised cost of emission reduction for biomass and wood
boilers, assuming a 20-year lifetime and 4 % discount rate. Note that we omit fuel
costs for want of information. In each case, the standard deviation far exceeds the
mean indicating that the subsidy varies hugely across households. The average
annual subsidy for carbon dioxide avoided by the GHS is far higher than the EU
ETS permit price which averaged €14/tCO2 in 2010 (Point Carbon 2011) or the
carbon tax of €20/tCO2.
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Fig. 1 Cost per tCO2 avoided per household: biomass boilers
5 In total, 4,139 households installed biomass boilers; however, when we restricted the sample we lost
803 of these observations.
6 113 households in total received grants for wood gasification boilers; however, we omitted some of
these observations based on the reported net cost.
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4.2 Relating the subsidy to replaced emissions of the household
Figure 3 compares the subsidies that households currently receive to the subsidies that
would be received were they proportional to the household’s level of emission
reduction. The graph shows that some households would receive a subsidy that is near
zero because the current emission levels of those households are low. These
households tend to use natural gas for water heating, space heating and cooking. The
accommodation may be relatively small in size, so that it is easier to heat or there may
be fewer occupants. The accommodation may have been recently built and, therefore,
complies with strict building regulations. Assuming all households still avail of the
scheme, over 99 % of households get a higher subsidy at present than they would if the
subsidy was levied at €15/tCO2; 1.2 % of households would be better off at a subsidy
level of €20/tCO2 and this figure rises to 5 % for a subsidy of €30/tCO2. The relatively
few households that benefit from an emissions related subsidy have very high levels of
emissions at present. They tend to be larger households, the accommodation tends to
be older and they are generally more difficult to heat. Also, they often employ very
inefficient heating methods, such as an open fire.
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Fig. 2 Cost per tCO2 avoided per household: wood gasification boilers
Table 3 Descriptive statistics:
biomass boilers and wood
gasification boilers
a Annual cost discounted at 4 %
over 20 years
Biomass
boilers
Wood gasification
boilers
Number of installations 3,336 104
Total amount in grants (€) 13,307,600 208,000
Average subsidy (€/tCO2)
a 316 227
Standard deviation (€/tCO2)
a 1,929 1,179
Minimum cost (€/tCO2)
a 5 4
Maximum cost (€/tCO2)
a 14,841 7,067
Median cost (€/tCO2)
a 30 13
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Table 10 shows the number of households that either gain or lose when the
subsidy is related to the emissions level of the household. Results show that
households receive a subsidy that is on average €2,912 higher than they would
receive under the €15/tCO2 scenario. Only 13 households would get a higher
subsidy if emission reduction was priced at €15/tCO2. They would gain an
average of €580 compared to the current system. Under the €20/tCO2 scenario,
98.8 % of households would see their subsidy reduced by an average of €2595
compared to the present system, but 41 households would gain an average of
€704. At a subsidy of €30/tCO2, 174 households benefit. The remaining
households get €2,018 more now than would be the case if the subsidy was
levied at €30/tCO2.
4.3 Changes in demand as a result of changes in the subsidy
It is reasonable to assume, however, that households would adjust their demand in
response to a change in the level of subsidy. Using OLS regressions, we find that the
price elasticity of demand for biomass boilers is -0.88 (0.02) and that for wood
gasification boilers is -1.87 (0.11). As previously stated, only 5 % of households
gain if the subsidy was levied at €30/tCO2 avoided. However, other high emission
households may enter the scheme if the subsidy system was changed to an emissions
related one. Similarly, households that have relatively low levels of emissions would
see their subsidy fall and we would expect demand from these households to
decrease. Table 4 shows how demand for the GHS changes as the subsidy changes.
For presentation purposes, the table displays the average change in the level of
demand exercised by different categories of households. There is large variation in
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the degree to which demand changes across household categories. This occurs
because of the variation in emissions levels, which, in turn, affects the degree
to which the present value of the total subsidy awarded to each household will
change.
We also consider the degree to which the GHS is economically and
environmentally efficient. In one scenario, we assume that the budget for the
scheme equals the current cost of the scheme for the restricted sample; €13.5
million and we simulate the maximum amount of emissions that can be avoided
for this cost. An important assumption is that each household availing of the
scheme receives the same subsidy per tCO2 avoided. We find that the subsidy in
this case is €57.21/tCO2. We also investigate the degree to which the cost can be
reduced while reaching the same level of emission avoidance. The subsidy
received by households in this case is €47.43/tCO2. The number and profile of
households availing of the scheme will change in each of these scenarios. The
results are displayed in Table 4.
Figure 4 displays the degree to which the cost of the scheme and level of
emission reduction changes. We find that by changing the current subsidy to one
which is based on the emissions level of each household, the cost of the scheme can
be reduced by €2.3 million and 17,383 tCO2 can still be avoided per annum. On the
other hand, if the budget of the scheme is €13.5 million, 1,679 extra tonnes of
carbon dioxide could be avoided each year by making the subsidy payment efficient.
These points are displayed in red in Fig. 4.
Present System
15/tCO2
20/tCO2
30/tCO2
No subsidy
0
2,000,000
4,000,000
6,000,000
8,000,000
10,000,000
12,000,000
14,000,000
16,000,000
9,200 11,200 13,200 15,200 17,200 19,200
Emission Avoidance
Increased emission avoidance
for the same cost
Samelevel of emission avoidance 
for reduced cost
: 32 categories
: 52
: 3440
categories
categories
Fig. 4 Changes in cost and emission reduction resulting from subsidy changes (colour figure online)
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In the absence of any subsidy at all, 1,829 households would still have installed
renewable energy technologies in their homes and the resulting level of emission
avoidance would have been 9,239 tCO2 per annum. The subsidies given to these
households totalled over €7 million. Consequently, the budget of €13.5 million is
only contributing to a reduction of 8,144 tCO2 per annum rather than 17,383. As
explained earlier, emission reduction could be increased by 1,679 tCO2 annually by
changing the way the subsidy is awarded. Thus, the scheme is only 8,114/
(8,114 ? 1,679) = 83 % environmentally efficient. Regarding efficiency of exche-
quer spending, the same level of emission reduction could have been achieved with
€11.2 million. Therefore, the scheme is only 11.2/13.5 = 83 % economically
efficient. The government overspends 17 %.
In the above, we treat each household in the GHS as a representative of a group
of households in the HBS. Recall that energy use and emissions of households in the
GHS were estimated based on the average energy usage and emissions levels of a
group of similar households in the HBS. As a sensitivity analysis, we aggregate the
GHS population into 32 groups and use the group’s average as the representative
household. Groups were chosen based on the subsidy received, the type of
accommodation and the number of bedrooms. The yellow points in Fig. 4 show the
results. The black points reflect the results that were derived when the GHS
population was aggregated into 52 groups. This reveals the effect of heterogeneity
on efficiency. The degree to which emission reduction can be increased for the same
cost and the extent to which costs can be reduced for the same level of emission
avoidance increases as the number of groups increases.
As another sensitivity analysis, we varied the price elasticities. We separately
estimated the price elasticity for each of the 8 types of household outlined in
Table 4. We then carry out the cost and emission reduction analyses on the
restricted sample using the most extreme elasticities.7 The resulting changes in
demand for the scheme, the cost of the scheme and the level of emission reduction
are presented in Table 5.
When demand is more elastic than it is in the base case, a small change in the
level of subsidy can have a big effect on the number and type of households availing
of the scheme. When demand is inelastic, the cost of the scheme is reduced
substantially to €8.6 million while the same level of emission avoidance is reached.
The subsidy in this case is €36.30/tCO2. At this price, low emission households see
a relatively large fall in the total subsidy they receive, but because demand is
inelastic, the total number of households availing of the scheme falls only slightly.
High emission households are always encouraged to avail of the scheme when the
subsidy is emissions related. Thus, the same level of emission reduction is reached
at a much lower cost. With inelastic demand, the level of emission reduction only
increases slightly because households do not adequately adjust their demand in
response to an increase in the level of the subsidy. When demand is elastic, emission
reduction reaches a higher level of 21,111 tCO2 per annum. If no subsidy is
provided and if demand is elastic, no households avail of the scheme. However, if
7 We also carried out the analysis using the upper and lower bound of the standard error for the elasticities
used in the base case; however, standard errors were small and the analysis was not very informative.
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demand is very inelastic, there will be a slight increase in the demand for the
scheme compared to the present system.
4.4 Welfare analysis
We measure the level of satisfaction that consumers derive from the GHS by
estimating each household’s consumer surplus.8 Consumer surplus is the
difference between the price a consumer is willing to pay and the price she
actually pays.
Table 5 Cost and emission scenarios under different price elasticities
PED €/tCO2 Annual emission
reduction (tCO2)
Total cost
(€)
Household
demand
Wood -1.87, biomass -0.88
Current system Various 17,383 13,515,600 3,440
Same level of emission avoidance for
reduced cost
47.43 17,383 11,205,686 3,165
Increased level of emission avoidance
for the same cost
57.21 19,061 13,515,600 3,440
No subsidy 0 9,239 0 1,829
€15/tCO2 15 11,814 3,543,636 2,252
€20/tCO2 20 12,673 4,724,848 2,392
€30/tCO2 30 14,390 7,087,272 2,674
Wood -2.3, biomass -2.23
Same level of emission avoidance for
reduced cost
48.36 17,383 11,423,738 2,772
Increased level of emission avoidance
for the same cost
57.21 21,111 13,515,600 3,387
No subsidy 0 -2,972 0 -587
€15/tCO2 15 3,342 3,543,636 455
€20/tCO2 20 5,447 4,724,848 802
€30/tCO2 30 9,656 7,087,272 1,497
Wood -1.01, biomass -0.04
Same level of emission avoidance for
reduced cost
36.30 17,383 8,575,600 3,419
Increased level of emission avoidance
for the same cost
57.21 17,659 13,515,600 3,461
No subsidy 0 16,906 0 3,346
€15/tCO2 15 17,103 3,543,636 3,376
€20/tCO2 20 17,169 4,724,848 3,386
€30/tCO2 30 17,300 7,087,272 3,406
8 Recall that we have data on the boiler, but not on fuel use.
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We do not have the information required to estimate producer surplus. The
subsidy on biomass and wood gasification boilers increases the producer surplus for
their manufacturers. However, households do not buy more boilers. The producer
surplus of the manufacturers of traditional boilers thus falls. One could argue that the
producer surplus is larger on a more advanced, subsidised product—so that the net
change in producer surplus would be positive—but we have no data on the size.
We estimate the consumer surplus under the current system of subsidisation as
well as in the scenarios in which the scheme is environmentally or economically
efficient. Some statistics are shown in Table 6. The total consumer surplus is highest
when environmental efficiency is maximised. The average consumer surplus is also
highest in this case, but the standard deviation is large. This happens because the
subsidy is emissions related. High emission households will benefit compared to the
current system, but low emission households will not. Both the total and average
consumer surpluses are higher under the current system than in the case where
economic efficiency is maximised. This happens because economic efficiency
results in fewer households availing of the scheme and some households would
receive lower subsidies than they do under the current system.
Table 6 also shows the subsidies and the net social gain (abstracting from the
producer surplus). The current GHS generates a consumer surplus of €17.5 million
at a cost to the exchequer of €13.5 million. There is a net gain of €4 million.
However, without a subsidy, the net gain would be €7.2 million. The GHS thus
destroys welfare (unless the change in producer surplus is large and positive). An
economically efficient subsidy would generate a net gain of €4.7 million—still
loss making. Adding the environmental benefits9 hardly changes the results. On
comparing the current subsidy with the best subsidy (none), the economic
efficiency is 58 %.
Table 6 Welfare analysis
CS: no
subsidy
CS: current
system
CS: 100 %
economically
efficient
CS: 100 %
environmentally
efficient
Consumer surplus (€) 7,245,831 17,519,686 15,893,294 18,254,751
Average surplus (€/h) 2,106 5,093 4,620 5,307
Standard deviation (€/h) 1,531 1,855 3,731 4,427
Producer surplus
Standard boilers Unknown Smaller Smaller Smaller
Climate-friendly boilers Unknown Larger Larger Larger
Cost to exchequer (€) 0 13,515,600 11,205,686 13,515,600
Economic gain (€) 7,245,831 4,004,086 4,687,608 4,739,151
Emissions (tCO2/year)
a 9,239 17,383 17,383 19,062
Net social gain (€) 7,384,416 4,264,831 4,948,353 5,025,081
a Emissions are valued at €15/tCO2
9 Carbon dioxide is valued at €15/tCO2, the shadow price of carbon set by the EU ETS. €15/tCO2 is close
to the central estimate of the social cost of carbon for a 1 % pure rate of time preference (Tol 2009).
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5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we present an ex-post estimate of the cost of carbon dioxide
emission reduction using administrative micro-data from the GHS in the Republic
of Ireland. The GHS subsidises the purchase of heating systems that use
renewable energy. We focus on biomass and wood gasification boilers. The
subsidy is independent of the amount or type of fuel replaced. The subsidy per
tonne of carbon dioxide avoided therefore varies considerably between house-
holds. We use the data to estimate price elasticities and construct a simulation
model that we use to optimise the subsidy. We find that it is possible to achieve
the same emission reduction with 17 % less exchequer spending, and that it is
possible to achieve 17 % more emission reduction for the same subsidy. 53 % of
the emissions avoided by bioenergy boilers would have been avoided without any
subsidy. Although the subsidy has benefits for consumers and the environment,
this comes at a cost to the exchequer; the subsidy reduces net social gain
(excluding producer surplus) by 42 %.
The GHS is a small subsidy in a small country. The total costs and avoided
emission are therefore small. However, the relatives are substantial. It could well be
that other greenhouse gas emission reduction programmes in other countries are just
as badly designed as the GHS and there are a number of factors that we have left out
of the analysis. First, we focused on bioenergy boilers, omitting the larger but
probably less effective subsidies for heat pumps and solar thermal. Second, we
ignore the interaction of the subsidy for renewable heat with the subsidy for home
insulation and the carbon tax on oil and gas. Third, we do not consider the lack of
coordination of the bioenergy subsidies with other instruments to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions and promote renewable energy. Fourth, we ignore the interactions of
the renewable heat subsidy with other taxes (excises, VAT). Therefore, ours is an
underestimate of the true inefficiency.
Besides highlighting the suboptimal design of one particular aspect of climate
policy in one particular country, the paper also shows that administrative micro-data
can be used for an ex-post evaluation of policy interventions. Studies like these
should be conducted for other programmes and other countries so that we can obtain
an estimate of the costs of actual emission reduction policy.
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Appendix
See Tables 7, 8, 9, and 10.
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Table 7 Demand for renewable technologies under the Greener Homes Scheme
Technology 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Freq. Cost
€000s
Freq. Cost
€000s
Freq. Cost
€000s
Freq. Cost
€000s
Freq. Cost
€000s
Air source heat
pump
308 1,232 364 1,360 269 537 72 145 26 52
Horizontal ground
collector heat
pump
1,549 6,661 1,034 4,160 590 1,475 42 105 14 35
Vertical ground
collector heat
pump
505 3,280 563 3,439 335 1,178 43 144 5 18
Water (well) to
water heat pump
43 187 46 187 37 93 7 18 1 3
Biomass boiler 2,411 10,100 1,215 4,930 454 1,323 49 123 10 25
Biomass stove 362 399 360 396 218 212 141 113 37 30
Biomass stove
with back boiler
272 490 146 263 109 177 64 90 23 32
Wood gasification
boiler
– – – – 46 92 59 118 11 22
Solar evacuated
tube
– – 330 396 2,317 2,800 2,152 2,606 902 1,056
Solar flat plate – – 675 902 3,496 4,597 1,832 2,368 1,026 1,270
Solar thermal for
hot water and
space heating
191 451 177 411 1 2 – – – –
Solar thermal for
hot water only
2,026 3,266 3,189 5,022 1 2 – – – –
Total 7,667 26,065 8,099 21,465 7,873 12,485 4,461 5,828 2,055 2,542
Table 8 Greener Homes Scheme grants 2006–2010
Technology Subsidy Year Average
installation
cost
Standard
deviation
Installation cost
estimated by
SEAI
Air source heat
pump
€4,000 Apr 2006–Oct
2007
€14,955 €7,772 €12,000–€13,000
€2,000 Oct 2007–2010
Horizontal ground
collector heat
pump
€4,300 Apr 2006–Oct
2007
€18,358 €7,048 €13,000–€15,000
€2,500 Oct 2007–2010
Vertical ground
collector heat
pump
€6,500 Apr 2006–Oct
2007
€21,940 €9,344 €18,000–€21,000
€3,500 Oct 2007–2010
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Table 8 continued
Technology Subsidy Year Average
installation
cost
Standard
deviation
Installation cost
estimated by
SEAI
Water (well) to water
heat pump
€4,300 Apr 2006–Oct
2007
€16,898 €7,604 €12,000–€14,000
€2,500 Oct 2007–2010
Biomass boiler €4,200 Apr 2006–Oct
2007
€9,553 €5,264 €10,000–€16,000
€3,000 Oct 2007–Aug
2008
€2,500 Aug 2008–2010
Biomass stove €1,100 Apr 2006–Aug
2008
€3,127 €31 €2,000–€5,000
€800 Aug 2008-2010
Biomass stove with
back boiler
€1,800 Apr 2006–Aug
2008
€5,587 €3,400 €4,000–€6,000
€1,400 Aug 2008–2010
Wood gasification
boiler
€2,000 July 2008–2010 €10,720 €3,967 €10,000–€16,000
Solar evacuated tube €300 per m2
(to max.
6 m2)
2006–2010 €5,915 €2,861 €800–€1,300
Solar flat plate €250 per m2
(to max.
6 m2)
2006–2010 €6,505 €3,112 €800–€1,300
Solar thermal for hot
water and space
heating
€300 per m2
(to max.
6 m2)
2006–2010 €10,694 €6,508 €800–€1,300
Solar thermal for hot
water only
€300 per m2
(to max.
6 m2)
2006–2010 €7,016 €4,612 €800–€1,300
Table 9 Growth factor in
energy use for new builds
compared to 2005
Year Adjustment
factor: electricity
Adjustment factor:
space heating
Adjustment factor:
total energy
2009 1.43 0.55 0.71
2008 1.38 0.81 0.89
2007 1.29 1 1.03
2006 1.19 1.01 1.04
2005 1 1 1
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